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Abstract 
Using departure day airfare data, this paper examines the pricing pattern on the Shanghai–
Beijing route and reveals anti-competitive pricing behaviour following the introduction of the 
„Air Express‟ service. This new service adds limited value to passengers because of the 
airport facility constraints. Jointly providing the „express‟ service has provided a channel 
through which the three dominant players can communicate effectively to achieve more 
stable prices at a higher level. Interestingly, lower prices charged by the fringe airlines on this 
route were accommodated by the big ones. Meanwhile, the three dominant airlines did not 
exhibit any obvious deviation in pricing from each other. 
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Introduction 
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies on the pattern of airline pricing attempt to explain 
price dispersion and variation. Price discrimination is traditionally seen as one of the sources 
of price variation, especially in the airline industry (Borenstein, 1985; Gale, 1993; Stavins, 
1996; Gerardi & Shapiro, 2007). A common phenomenon is that business passengers pay 
much higher prices than leisure travellers who have budget constraints and are more sensitive 
to changes in airfares (Wang & Song, 2010). Oligopolistic strategies used by the players on a 
typical oligopoly route might be another source of price variation. Game theorists have 
modelled the conditions that might have resulted in price wars and price collusion between 
competitors (Green & Porter, 1984; Rotemberg & Saloner, 1986; Slade, 1989). In many of 
these theoretical works, change in demand has been seen as a trigger for change in price. 
Dana (1999) demonstrated that price rigidities and demand uncertainty lead not only to inter-
firm price dispersion, but also to intra-firm price dispersion. Dana also predicted that price 
increases with the number of firms. Some airline economics literature has shown that price 
dispersion is significantly influenced by competition and airport dominance (Borenstein, 
1989; Borenstein & Rose, 1994; Evans & Kessides, 1993). A recent study by Mantin and 
Koo (2009) claimed that price dispersion is affected by demand variables such as population, 
income and the share of business passengers, as well as the presence of low-cost carriers. 
They, however, dismissed the importance of market concentration. 
Studying a single route‟s pricing pattern across airlines could provide more in-depth 
analysis of airline pricing. By examining the airfares on the London–New York route, 
Bilotkach (2006) found that prices aimed at business travellers are different between airlines 
while leisure airfares are not. Bilotkach et al. (2010) reported noticeably different pricing 
strategies used by competitors in the same market. This paper will look at the airfare 
variations on the most important route in China: the Shanghai–Beijing route. Some special 
features of this route differentiate this study from existing works. First, although such 
regulation has been removed from most other domestic routes, entry into and exit from the 
Shanghai–Beijing route are still regulated considering that Beijing and Shanghai airports 
operate at close-to-full capacity, which means that potential competition does not exist. Since 
2006, five airlines have provided services on this route, including Air China, China Eastern 
Airlines, Shanghai Airlines, Hainan Airlines and China Southern Airlines. Second, following 
the proposal by the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC), the „Air 
Express‟ service was introduced on this route from August 2007, with special check-in 
counters, baggage carousels, security check points, and dedicated boarding channels. All five 
airlines joined this program and collectively forged the brand „Air Express‟. However, all 
these airlines were publicly listed companies and so had to compete against each other for 
their own interests. In fact, they had done so in the past on many domestic routes, and 
cutthroat competition, or price wars, were not uncommon (Zhang & Round, 2009). It is 
interesting to find out how these airlines priced on the Shanghai–Beijing route, especially 
how the prices varied across airlines before and after the introduction of the „Air Express‟ 
service. This paper will address these issues by examining the average airfare of each airline 
on the departure day. 
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 Shanghai–Beijing ‘Air Express’ and the Data 
China launched high-speed train services in April 2007 with the introduction of bullet trains 
(called Dong Che Zu or D train in China), reducing travel time from Shanghai to Beijing 
from 13 hours to 10 hours. This improvement in train services has continued. A high-speed 
railway linking Shanghai and Beijing will be completed by the end of 2011, reducing travel 
time between the two cities to less than four hours. Therefore, train services are set to 
challenge the air services and attract business passengers who are crucial to airlines‟ revenue. 
The CAAC admitted that looming competition from the rail industry nationwide triggered 
the proposal to establish a joint „Air Express‟ service between Beijing and Shanghai. The 
aviation authorities hoped that, if successful, this operation model could be applied to other 
domestic routes. The essence of this program appears to be to provide faster and more 
flexible services to retain  business passengers. Special check-in areas and fast-track security 
check channels were set up at both Beijing Capital Airport and Shanghai Hongqiao Airport 
for passengers travelling between the two cities. Special arrangements were made for 
boarding and baggage services as well as the use of VIP lounges. The most important 
arrangement between the five airlines servicing this route was that a ticket from one airline 
could be endorsed to another airline unconditionally (Zhou, 2007). 
It was hoped that, with all these arrangements, travel time between Shanghai and Beijing 
could be contained to three hours from the point of check-in to the point of leaving the 
destination airport (including two hours‟ flying time). The „Air Express‟ service also aimed to 
allow a passenger to depart any time they arrived at the airport from 7 am to 10 pm by 
providing at least one departure every 15 minutes during peak time. To build the reputation of 
the brand, the eventual goal for punctuality was declared to be 90%, with the initial goal 
being 85% (Xu & Chen, 2007). On the introduction of the „Air Express‟ service in August 
2007, China Eastern and Air China commanded the largest market share, with 14 and 11 
flights from Shanghai to Beijing a day respectively, followed by Shanghai Airlines‟ six 
flights (Timetable, 2007). Daily frequency for Hainan Airlines was three while China 
Southern only operated one service every day. Such a market share distribution is not 
surprising as the two national carriers,
2
 China Eastern and Air China, are headquartered in 
Shanghai and Beijing respectively. Shanghai is also home to Shanghai Airlines, a local 
carrier mainly owned by the Shanghai government. These were the only three carriers 
servicing the Shanghai–Beijing market until the early 2000s, when Hainan Airlines gained 
access rights. China Southern was granted the right to fly the route in 2006. A total of 5.79 
million passengers were transported by air between Shanghai and Beijing in 2007 with an 
average load factor of 80.94%, making this route the busiest market in China (Statistical Data 
on Civil Aviation of China, 2008). Guo et al. (2006) noted that Beijing and Shanghai are two 
of the most important source markets for outbound tourists. Undoubtedly, they also generate 
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 All the national airlines including Air China, China Eastern and China Southern, have been partly privatised 
since the late 1990s (Zhang & Round, 2008).  
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and attract a large number of domestic tourists to the air services between Beijing and 
Shanghai, as these two cities are classical tourism destinations. Therefore, studying the 
pricing behaviour on this route not only has significant implications for business travellers, 
but also for leisure travellers and the tourism industry in general. 
Immediately after the launch of the „Air Express‟ route on 6 August 2007, the airfares 
between Shanghai and Beijing went up substantially. , This increase was reported widely (Xu 
& Chen, 2007), and people became concerned that the „Air Express‟ service would be used as 
a platform to facilitate price collusion. The airlines quickly denied this accusation and 
reduced their airfares (Liu, 2007). However, when critics were appeased, another round of 
price increases followed (Li, 2007). 
The airfare data used for this study come from the sales information of an agent at the 
Shanghai airports.
3 
This agent has been in the top five agents selling Shanghai–Beijing tickets 
for China Eastern in the past few years and is the largest in the airport area.
4 
As this agent is 
based at the airport, 80% of the passengers who purchase tickets immediately fly out. 
Therefore, the airfare can be regarded as the departure day price. The agent‟s monthly 
statistics report the daily sales revenue and the number of tickets sold for each airline. Thus, 
the average price for a particular day can be calculated. If the sales revenue of a particular 
day includes business or first-class tickets, they are removed from the data. Therefore, the 
final airfare data represent one-way daily economy class (with or without discount) price 
from Shanghai to Beijing for the period from January 2007 to December 2007 for all five 
airlines mentioned above.
5
 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the airfare data. China 
Eastern has the highest average airfare for 2007 while Shanghai Airlines has the lowest. The 
coefficients of variation for each month are also presented in the table. This indicator 
measures price dispersion. It appears that China Eastern had a more stable and smaller 
dispersion in the second half of 2007. All airlines had relatively high price dispersion in the 
first two months, normally indicating relatively strong competition (see Borenstein and Rose, 
1994). It can be seen that most of the airlines experienced lower price dispersion in August, 
but in the following months, relatively large price variations still existed for China Southern, 
Hainan Airlines and Shanghai Airlines. Surprisingly, all carriers showed considerably low 
variations in price in December. Although December is a busy season in western countries, it 
has never been a peak season for air travel in China. It is, therefore, highly likely that a 
collusive agreement was reached that restricted competition. 
                                                          
3
 There are two airports in Shanghai: Hongqiao and Pudong. In particular, the „Air Express‟ refers to the 
services between Beijing airport and Hongqiao airport. Both China Eastern and Air China have some flights to 
Beijing departing from Pudong airport (mainly in connection with an international sector), but the sales report 
did not separate them from those departing from Hongqiao airport. As a result, this study treats the two airports 
as one.  
4
 This agent sells tickets for all the airlines.  
5
 Fewer observations were obtained for Hainan and China Southern Airlines because of their low frequency in 
2007.  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Airfares 
 Obs. Average  Std. dev. Min Max Coefficient of variation (%) 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
China 
Eastern 
249 888.59 213.93 410 1130 32.1 34.3 24.9 19.7 27.2 21.0 18.5 18.4 18.2 23.0 15.9 1.3 
Air 
China 
225 882.65 201.43 340 1130 31.5 34.5 23.4 20.1 20.2 17.8 19.3 24.0 18.6 24.3 13.8 1.6 
Shanghai 
Airlines 
257 809.57 241.81 230 1130 30.2 34.2 25.7 20.9 27.0 32.5 24.5 21.1 30.3 27.8 29.0 6.0 
Hainan 
Airlines 
286 833.08 243.51 230 1130 47.9 29.6 38.0 21.2 31.4 27.1 19.7 22.4 31.3 26.9 23.3 5.8 
China 
Southern 
171 860.67 238.48 450 1130 52.9 31.7 27.4 28.0 28.1 23.9 26.9 16.1 26.2 28.8 37.6 13.2 
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Model Estimation and Discussion of Results 
A Dickey–Fuller (DF) test was conducted to see whether the time series price data of the five 
airlines follow a unit root process. There has been strong evidence against a unit root and in 
favour of a stationary process. It is therefore legitimate to estimate a time series OLS model 
to see the pricing patterns across airlines before and after the introduction of the „Air 
Express‟ service. The dependent variable is the departure day average airfare in logarithm 
form. How the prices vary during a week is of interest. Dummies were thus created for 
Tuesday to Sunday and Monday was chosen as the benchmark. Monthly dummies were also 
included to capture the effect of changes in demand from month to month. January was set as 
the base category. A POSTAUG dummy was included to see if the prices after July were 
higher than in the previous months. It takes the value of 1 for the period from August to 
December. Interactions between POSTAUG and the daily dummies of a week allow the price 
fluctuations after the introduction of „Air Express‟ service to be checked. The estimation 
results of using all five airlines‟ aggregate data can be found in Table 2. The POSTAUG was 
dropped in model specification 1 due to the multicollinearity problem. To clearly reveal the 
change in prices after August, specification 2 including POSTAUG was estimated. Robust 
standard errors were reported to accommodate the potential autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity problems. 
Table 2 OLS Estimation Results Using Aggregate Data 
Specification 1 (dependent variable 
logairfare) 
Specification 2 (dependent variable 
logairfare) 
Independent 
variable 
Coefficients Robust 
Std. Err. 
Independent 
variables  
Coefficients  Robust 
Std. Err. 
China Eastern  0.051** 0.023 China Eastern  0.050** 0.024 
Air China 0.048** 0.024 Air China 0.045* 0.025 
China 
Southern 
–0.084*** 0.030 China Southern –0.075** 0.031 
Hainan 
Airlines 
–0.071*** 0.026 Hainan Airlines –0.056** 0.028 
Tuesday 0.083** 0.040 Tuesday 0.078* 0.042 
Wednesday 0.189*** 0.041 Wednesday 0.178*** 0.043 
Thursday 0.218*** 0.042 Thursday 0.194*** 0.044 
Friday 0.232*** 0.029 Friday 0.234*** 0.049 
Saturday –0.024 0.042 Saturday –0.026 0.045 
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Sunday 0.170*** 0.040 Sunday 0.173*** 0.040 
Postaug*tue –0.102* 0.058 Postaug*tue –0.090 0.062 
Postaug*wed –0.140** 0.060 Postaug*wed –0.130** 0.064 
Postaug*thu –0.206*** 0.066 Postaug*thu –0.153** 0.071 
Postaug*fri –0.094 0.057 Postaug*fri –0.091 0.059 
Postaug*sat –0.026 0.065 Postaug*sat –0.010 0.070 
Postaug*sun –0.104* 0.056 Postaug*sun –0.082 0.058 
Feb 0.105** 0.053 Postaug 0.197*** 0.040 
Mar 0.123*** 0.046    
Apr 0.267*** 0.045    
May 0.091** 0.043    
Jun 0.121*** 0.043    
Jul 0.251*** 0.043    
Aug 0.400*** 0.048    
Sep 0.226*** 0.061    
Oct 0.288*** 0.059    
Nov 0.326*** 0.061    
Dec 0.550*** 0.055    
Constant 6.458*** 0.043    
Number of 
observations 
1188 Number of 
observations 
1188 
R-squared  0.2128 R-squared  0.1235 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
Both specifications produce similar results. Specification 1 shows that China Eastern and Air 
China charged significantly higher prices (about 5%) than Shanghai Airlines while China 
Southern and Hainan Airlines charged much lower airfares (by 7.1% and 8.4% respectively). 
Zhang and Round (2009) reported the aggressive pricing strategy used by Hainan Airlines to 
expand its domestic networks. Similar strategy might have been used here to establish 
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reputation in this relatively new market. Given the smaller market share commanded by 
China Southern and Hainan Airlines on this route, we cannot exclude the possibility that the 
low prices were compensation for their service quality defects of few flights. In addition, 
even though the Shanghai–Beijing market is dominated by business passengers, the absolute 
number of leisure travellers should not be underestimated. Therefore, it is also likely that the 
two airlines deliberately targeted this group of price-sensitive passengers. 
It is noticeable that all other months had significantly higher prices than January. This 
might be explained by the fact that January is the start of a new financial year and business 
activities are generally low in the advent of the Chinese New Year. April is usually a peak 
season for both business and leisure travel in China. Therefore, the price was about 26.7% 
higher than in January on average. However, it is difficult to explain why the prices were so 
significantly higher in all months in the second half of 2007. The only reason points to price 
collusion. The POSTAUG variable in specification 2 clearly indicates that airfares after July 
were about 20% higher than in the first few months on average. 
There were reports alluding to price collusion, which was caused by the requirement of 
unconditional endorsement of the tickets for the convenience of passengers, even for a ticket 
with 70% discount off the full airfare (1130 Chinese Yuan). Meanwhile, the CAAC required 
that the airline that actually transported the passenger must settle the ticket at 85% of the 
published airfare (1130 Chinese Yuan) with the issuing carrier (Xu & Chen, 2007). Although 
this has never been formally confirmed, this senseless requirement is consistent with the 
CAAC‟s attitude towards competition, i.e., it does not want to see strong competition 
between airlines or the offering of deep discounts (see Zhang & Round, 2008 for details). 
Some passengers might abuse this privilege by buying a cheap night ticket and flying on peak 
hour flights with another airline. The issuing carrier would thus suffer a loss by paying the 
difference. Xu and Chen quoted an anonymous person from Air China: „airlines will achieve 
balance in the long run as all the participants face the same problem and we have to endorse 
tickets to each other reciprocally‟. However, given the imbalanced frequencies between 
airlines, it would not be possible for such a long-run balance to be achieved. In addition, as 
with many other businesses, airlines tend to focus on the short-run profits and losses. 
Therefore, what was observed after 6 August was that all the airlines sold full price or a price 
with only 10% off to avoid „endorsable‟ losses. Such a simultaneous increase in prices 
angered the public and the motivation of introducing the „Air Express‟ service was 
questioned. Although the airlines argued that August was a traditional peak season for air 
travel due to summer holidays, merely a few days later there was a plunge in airfares 
followed by a sudden increase (Li, 2007). The endorsement rule was subsequently changed – 
only tickets with less than 20% discount were endorsable. Li described the airfares on the 
route from Shanghai to Beijing as „roller coaster‟ following the introduction of the „Air 
Express‟ service and that it is difficult to know what happened behind the dramatic changes 
in prices. 
Price wars and collusion are two common phenomena in China‟s domestic airline markets. 
This is because most explicit and implicit price collusive agreements do not last long, as 
observed by Zhang and Round (2009). They found that many price-fixing agreements were 
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actually very vulnerable and could be easily upset by a change in outside conditions such as 
demand. Cutthroat competition would occur before a new agreement could be negotiated. It 
seems that their observations were still valid for the Shanghai–Beijing market in 2007. 
However, without the joint „express‟ service, most of the collusive behaviours might have 
been deterred by the new Anti-Monopoly Law, while with this new program, airlines could 
freely engage in any talks in the name of seeking cooperation and providing better air express 
services. This joint service might serve as tool to disguise illegal activities. 
A question might naturally arise. Given the conditions conducive to price collusion and 
the high possibility that the airlines did collude, why did the five carriers not charge similar 
prices on average? After all, these airlines can easily monitor each other‟s sales and price 
information to enforce a collusive agreement as they use the same reservation system. 
However, quite often, a stable collusion does not mean that all players price the same. Some 
members with low frequency would be disadvantaged by charging the same price as the 
dominant players. Therefore, to reduce the chance of the fringe players deviating, the major 
players had to accommodate them by allowing them to price lower. This strategy is widely 
known in China‟s airline industry and developed from numerous failures in achieving durable 
collusion. 
Specifications 1 and 2 also show that, apart from Saturday, the airfares on other days were 
significantly higher than on Monday. For example, the price on Friday was 23.2% higher. 
One interesting finding from the models is that since the introduction of the „Air Express‟ 
service, the airfares on other days were lower than before. For example, the price on Friday 
was only 13.8% (0.232–0.094) higher than that on Monday. Apart from Saturday, all other 
daily variables and the corresponding interaction terms are jointly significant, which shows 
that airlines gained more power in setting their prices and were able to price within a smaller 
range. This is consistent with the price dispersion patterns presented in Table 1. 
Table 3 OLS Estimation Results for Individual Airlines (dependent variable logairfare) 
Variables  China 
Eastern 
 
Air China Shanghai 
Airlines 
China 
Southern 
Hainan 
Airlines 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. 
Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. 
Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. 
Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. 
Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. 
Err.) 
Tuesday 0.122 
(0.076) 
0.091 
(0.080) 
0.064 
(0.083) 
0.039 
(0.117) 
0.120 
(0.103) 
Wednesday 0.220*** 
(0.076) 
0.186** 
(0.081) 
0.212** 
(0.083) 
0.152 
(0.118) 
0.174 
(0.107) 
Thursday 0.168* 0.325*** 0.247*** 0.231** 0.150 
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(0.087) (0.081) (0.092) (0.104) (0.106) 
Friday 0.323*** 
(0.066) 
0.320*** 
(0.074) 
0.218*** 
(0.079) 
0.037 
(0.118) 
0.221** 
(0.106) 
Saturday 0.007 
(0.079) 
0.092 
(0.077) 
–0.053 
(0.088) 
–0.101 
(0.141) 
–0.091 
(0.104) 
Sunday 0.184** 
(0.074) 
0.202** 
(0.082) 
0.175** 
(0.086) 
0.115 
(0.132) 
0.189 
(0.097) 
Postaug*tue –0.124 
(0.109) 
–0.129 
(0.106) 
–0.159 
(0.128) 
–0.158 
(0.168) 
–0.053 
(0.141) 
Postaug*wed –0.217** 
(0.100) 
–0.228 
(0.142) 
–0.312** 
(0.133) 
–0.011 
(0.195) 
–0.011 
(0.142) 
Postaug*thu 0.269 
(0.127) 
–0.324*** 
(0.115) 
–0.308** 
(0.155) 
–0.213 
(0.185) 
–0.054 
(0.154) 
Postaug*fri –0.208** 
(0.087) 
–0.257** 
(0.112) 
–0.196 
(0.121) 
0.218 
(0.170) 
–0.184 
(0.146) 
Postaug*sat –0.064 
(0.107) 
–0.154 
(0.111) 
–0.075 
(0.143) 
–0.026 
(0.198) 
0.127 
(0.161) 
Postaug*sun –0.154 
(0.103) 
–0.222** 
(0.112) 
–0.204* 
(0.122) 
0.088 
(0.174) 
–0.062 
(0.131) 
Feb 0.059 
(0.103) 
–0.068 
(0.097) 
0.045 
(0.099) 
0.240 
(0.187) 
0.290 
(0.141) 
Mar 0.131* 
(0.076) 
0.116 
(0.080) 
0.103 
(0.071) 
0.239 
(0.174) 
0.079 
(0.145) 
Apr 0.283*** 
(0.075) 
0.251*** 
(0.086) 
0.238*** 
(0.074) 
0.246 
(0.176) 
0.375*** 
(0.131) 
May 0.052 
(0.081) 
0.127* 
(0.076) 
0.057 
(0.078) 
0.148 
(0.177) 
0.102 
(0.135) 
Jun 0.207*** 0.143* –0.012 0.104 0.147 
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(0.069) (0.073) (0.086) (0.169) (0.128) 
Jul 0.259*** 
(0.070) 
0.207** 
(0.082) 
0.173** 
(0.079) 
0.258 
(0.175) 
0.376*** 
(0.122) 
Aug 0.397*** 
(0.099) 
0.366*** 
(0.128) 
0.414*** 
(0.110) 
0.484** 
(0.219) 
0.409** 
(0.160) 
Sep 0.310*** 
(0.099) 
0.329*** 
(0.114) 
0.130 
(0.118) 
0.301 
(0.210) 
0.180 
(0.170) 
Oct 0.267*** 
(0.099) 
0.284** 
(0.127) 
0.330*** 
(0.112) 
0.328 
(0.212) 
0.315** 
(0.160) 
Nov 0.433*** 
(0.095) 
0.434*** 
(0.116) 
0.265** 
(0.118) 
0.123 
(0.208) 
0.370** 
(0.169) 
Dec 0.596*** 
(0.089) 
0.571*** 
(0.106) 
0.554*** 
(0.109) 
0.584*** 
(0.214) 
0.577*** 
(0.151) 
Constant 6.442*** 
(0.075) 
6.447*** 
(0.098) 
6.490*** 
(0.078) 
6.338*** 
(0.178) 
6.291*** 
(0.132) 
Number of 
observations 
249 225 257 171 286 
R-squared  0.296 0.274 0.213 0.242 0.262 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
It is better to break down the aggregate data to see the individual carrier‟s pricing patterns. 
Chow tests have been conducted to see if the coefficients in the five equations reported in 
Table 3 are equal. Interestingly, the coefficients for the three big players on this route are not 
significantly different from each other (A statistic F(23,427) = 0.57 for China Eastern and Air 
China, and F(23, 458) = 0.82 for China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines). However, China 
Eastern has significantly different coefficients from China Southern and Hainan Airlines 
(F(21, 375) = 3.08 and F(23, 488) = 2.27 respectively) while the coefficients between China 
Southern and Hainan are roughly equal (F(23, 410) = 1.14). Such evidence suggests that Air 
China and China Eastern closely matched each other in pricing while the two fringe players 
appeared to adopt similar pricing strategies. It should be noted that during most of the days in 
a week, China Southern and Hainan Airlines did not exhibit significant fluctuations in prices, 
as did China Eastern and Air China. For example, apart from Friday, the other days did not 
see significantly higher or lower prices than Monday while this was not the case for China 
Eastern and Air China, most of whose departure day prices were significantly higher. Similar 
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patterns can be observed from the monthly dummies. It seems that the three big players were 
able to charge statistically and economically higher prices than they charged in January, 
especially in the second half of the year. This is consistent with the findings from the model 
using the aggregate data that the dominant airlines on this route possessed more market 
power. They would not worry about losing passengers as their services dominated peak hours, 
which were important to price-insensitive passengers. The introduction of the „Air Express‟ 
service seems to have strengthened their pricing ability on this route. 
It is evident that passengers were worse off on this route in terms of the prices paid. The 
question is whether they have received better services as initially hoped. As mentioned earlier, 
some passengers abused the unconditional endorsement rule. So did the airlines. Some of 
them oversold far more seats than the normal number of „no show‟ passengers because the 
cost of handling the overbooked passengers became very low. The airlines could easily put 
them onto another flight in the next 15 or 30 minutes regardless of the operating carriers and 
complaints about overbooking have been increasing. 
It has also been reported that the check-in counters dedicated to „Air Express‟ could not 
meet the increasing number of passengers, with the queues for check-in and security check 
sometimes being longer than those of other flights (Zhou, 2007). Another factor beyond the 
control of the airlines is that flights between Beijing and Shanghai are frequently delayed due 
to air traffic control, which makes the „three hour‟ goal from one airport to the other almost 
impossible. In fact, what impressed passengers most were the increased prices, not any 
improvement in services. 
 
Conclusion 
Using the departure day airfare data, this paper has conducted an in-depth analysis of the 
pricing patterns on the Shanghai–Beijing route with a focus on its most likely anti-
competitive pricing behaviour following the introduction of the „Air Express‟ service model. 
This new service has been tarnished by airport facility constraints coupled with a substantial 
increase in prices. Jointly providing the „express‟ service has provided a channel through 
which the three dominant players could communicate effectively to achieve more stable 
prices at a higher level. Interestingly, lower prices charged by the fringe airlines on this route 
were accommodated by the big ones. Meanwhile, the three dominant airlines did not exhibit 
obvious deviation in pricing from each other. 
Given that the Shanghai–Beijing route is the most heavily travelled market in China, the 
detrimental effect of the explicit and implicit collusive behaviour on passengers should not be 
underestimated, especially when most of the promised conveniences have not yet been 
realised. It would be more dangerous if this model were implemented on other routes, 
allowing the airlines to shelter from the threat of competition from high-speed rail services. 
This would not only hamper business travel, but would also damage leisure travel and the 
tourism industry in general. It is therefore suggested that the antitrust authorities should keep 
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a close eye on this service model and take necessary actions to ensure that competition 
remains in the market. 
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